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CaseNo.20070962-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Ernest John Young, aka Jason Pressley,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge. This Court has jurisdiction
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue. Did the trial court properly deny the motion to withdraw Defendant's
guilty plea?
Standard of Review. A denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed
for abuse of discretion; underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, f 7,140 P3d 1288. This Court need not reach the
merits, however, because Defendant fails to comply with the marshaling and
briefing requirements set forth in rule 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by the constitutional
standard embodied in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008):
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
made.
Appellate marshaling and briefing requirements are contained in rule 24(a)(9). See
Addendum A (Statutes & Rules).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In May 2006, Defendant was charged with two counts of influencing,
impeding, or retaliating against a judge, third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-8-316(1) (West 2004) (R. 4-2). Because the threats were made
against Third Judicial District Court judges, the case was transferred to the Fourth
Judicial District (R. 8). The Utah County Legal Defender Association [LDA] was
appointed to represent Defendant (R. 12-11).
Though LDA was appointed, Defendant filed various pro se requests and
motions, expressing his belief that he was Elvis Presley's biological son and that the
Presley family had conspired against him to deprive him of custody of his children
and a $750,000.00 settlement (R. 45-35 & 51). In July 2006, the trial court appointed
two alienists to examine Defendant to determine his competency to stand trial (R.

2

61-56). After examining Defendant, the alienists, Drs. Richard R. Wootton and Eric
Nielsen, reported that he was not competent (R. 170 & R. 171).1
In a subsequent evidentiary hearing, the doctors testified that Defendant
suffered from a delusional disorder, either of a grandiose or persecutory type, or
possibly paranoid schizophrenia (R407: 5-6 & 15). See also R170: 4; R171: 1. Dr.
Wootton characterized Defendant as intelligent, with a good vocabulary and a 10th
grade or higher reading ability (R407:8). See also R170:2. Both doctors concluded
that Defendant had a factual understanding of the charges and the court process,
including an understanding of what he was accused of doing, the potential penalties
he faced, the possibility of consecutive sentences, and the adversary nature of the
proceedings (R407:9-12 & 17). See also R170:3; R171:2. According to the doctors, he
understood that if he pled guilty, he would be acknowledging responsibility for his
criminal conduct and waiving trial (R171:7). Defendant could distinguish between

1

These two competency reports, plus two subsequent reports, are under seal.
See R. 170,171,246 & 337. Consequently, the State refers to their contents only in
general terms and as necessary to respond to Defendant's allegations. Drs. Wootton
and Nielsen additionally testified and the court entered findings regarding
Defendant's mental status (R. 191-85 & 344-38; R. 407). The testimony and findings
are not under seal.
3

the implications of a guilty plea and a plea of no contest (id.).2 Nevertheless,
Defendant's delusional beliefs prevented him from rationally conferring with LDA
or engaging in strategic decisions (R407: 6-7 & 17-21). See also R170:5-6; R171:2 &
7). In October 2006, the court found that Defendant was incompetent and
transferred him to the state hospital for treatment (R407:26-27; R. 191-83).
Defendant's status was reviewed in March 2007 (R. 229 & 243). The hospital
doctors, Drs. Richard Spencer and Robert Sawicki, opined that while Defendant
maintained a factual understanding of the case and proceedings, he still lacked a
rational understanding (R. 246). For example, he could "independently state the
rights that he would be surrendering if he pled guilty," but his delusional beliefs
dominated and interfered with a rational discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of a potential plea bargain (R246:4). The court found that Defendant
was still incompetent and set a review hearing for May 31,2007 (R. 250).
By the time of the May hearing, Defendant's competency was restored. Drs.
Spencer and Sawicki opined that while Defendant retained the belief that he was
Elvis's son, he could now compartmentalize and control his delusional thinking (R.
337). As always, Defendant had a factual understanding of the proceedings and
2

Defendant was previously convicted of other offenses and apparently pled
no contest in some cases (R. 171: 7). The presentence report is under seal (R. 403)
The State refers to its contents only in general terms and as necessary to respond to
Defendant's allegations.
4

could state the constitutional rights he would waive if he pled guilty (R337:3). But
he had regained a rational imderstanding and could now discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of a plea bargain (id.). Moreover, he had gained insight into his
own conduct. He now recognized that his desire to be acknowledged as Elvis' son
has "nothing to do with my [criminal] case" (id.). And he could identify factors that
may have contributed to his criminal conduct, as well as possible mitigating
circumstances and defenses (id.).
Defense counsel did not contest the doctors' findings and stipulated that
Defendant was competent (R410:2). Consequently, the court ruled that Defendant
was competent to proceed to trial and entered findings concerning his
understanding of the charges and the criminal process:
[Finding 2] . . . The defendant can state the pending charges against
him, and accurately describe! ] the general aiminal justice process he
now faces including its adversarial nature and the various roles of the
parties to those court proceedings.
[Finding 3]... [T]he defendant can now have positive interactions with
his attorney and can appreciate the benefits of that relationship. The
defendant can accurately relate factors that go into his criminal case,
mitigating circumstances and possible defenses and can make reasoned
choices in accordance with facts he may wish to discuss with his
counsel[.]
[Finding 4]... [T]he defendant is able to differentiate potential penalties
carried by either a felony or misdemeanor conviction [that] could result
in this case and therefore has the present capacity to comprehend and
appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties that may be
imposed in the proceedings against him. . . . [T]he defendant
5

understands the penalties that may be imposed in the event he were
convicted of the offenses charged against him.
[Finding 5]... [T]he defendant has the present capacity to engage in
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options and to appreciate the
consequences of choosing to represent himself or taking the advice of
counsel.
[Finding 6] . . . [T]he defendant has the capacity to, and in fact
understands the adversary nature of the proceedings against him and
the roles of the attorneys, the judge, and the jury applicable to his
case[.]
(R. 341-42). See also Addendum B (Findings Re: Competency Restoration).
On June 14,2007, two weeks after the court entered these findings, Defendant
pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement (R. 348-47). Defendant acknowledged the
terms of the agreement in his written Statement in Support of Guilty Plea:
I will plead to Count I as charged. The State will dismiss Count 2. The
State is not opposed to a 402 reduction of Count I to a Class A
misdemeanor so long as I successfully complete probation. The State
will recommend that my sentence be served at the mental health court.
(R. 352). At the same time, Defendant acknowledged in the Statement that the
potential penalty he faced was a prison sentence of up to five years and a $5,000.00
fine, which sentence could additionally include an 85% surcharge and a $25.00
security fee (R. 357). He also acknowledged that the prosecutor's sentencing
recommendation was not binding on the court (R. 352). See also Addendum C
(Statement in Support of Guilty Plea).

6

After defense counsel restated the terms of the plea agreement in open court,
the court inquired into Defendant's understanding of the plea by asking if defense
coimsel had reviewed the written Statement with Defendant and if counsel believed
that Defendant understood the constitutional rights delineated in the Statement
(R404:2-3). Defense counsel replied that Defendant had read the Statement and that
counsel also had reviewed it with him (R404:3). Based on their discussion, defense
coimsel opined that Defendant understood the rights he was waiving in pleading
guilty and the potential penalty he faced (id.).
The court then asked Defendant if he agreed with his counsel's
representations; Defendant replied that the statements were correct (id.). The court
asked Defendant if he understood that by pleading guilty, he was "giv[ing] up" the
constitutional rights set out in the Statement and that he would have "no further
opportunity to contest the charges against you" (id.). Defendant affirmed that he
understood and quipped, "The file's not going to get any bigger, your Honor" (id.).
The court assured Defendant that it made no difference how large the file got, the
question was how the criminal case would be settled (id.). Defendant agreed (id.).
See Add. C (Plea Hearing).
When the court asked Defendant if he had "any questions or concerns" he
would like to discuss, Defendant turned to his attorney and asked, "Only - you did
say transfer to mental health [c]ourt correct" (R404:3-4). After counsel replied in the
7

affirmative, Defendant responded, "I understand" (R404:4). The court followed up
by asking Defendant if he understood that nevertheless a sentence of up to five
years in prison could be imposed; Defendant said, "Yes" (id.). The court again
asked if he understood that "there are no guarantees of what the sentence might be,
except that the maximum sentence can be imposed," and Defendant responded,
"Yes, sir. I do" (id.). See Add. C.
Defendant signed the Statement (R404: 5), The court found that Defendant
had reviewed and understood the Statement, including the potential penalties and
the court's right to impose a prison sentence (id.). The court further found that
Defendant was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty (id.). Defendant did
not dispute these findings. Defendant then pled guilty to Count I; the court found
the plea knowing and voluntary. Count II was dismissed. (R404: 5-6).
A month later, LDA withdrew and conflict counsel was appointed; sentencing
was also continued (R. 363 & 366). In September 2007, conflict counsel filed a
motion to withdraw Defendant's plea (R. 382-73). The motion alleged three grounds
for withdrawal: (1) LDA was ineffective for failing to adequately advise Defendant
of his rights; (2) no one told him that a surcharge and security fee could be imposed;
and (3) the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(id.). The prosecutor opposed the motion because none of the

allegations established that the plea was not knowing and voluntary (R. 397-90).
8

The court reviewed an audiotape of the plea hearing and found no rule 11 violation
(R. 402-1). The court concluded that the plea was knowing and voluntary and
denied tine motion to withdraw (id.).
The same day, November 1,2007, Defendant was sentenced. Though defense
counsel and the prosecutor recommended probation, the presentence report
recommend prison (R. 403: R405:4-10). The court opined that Defendant was not a
good candidate for probation and sentenced him to zero-to-five years
imprisonment, granting credit for the pre-plea time Defendant was in jail and the
state hospital (R. 402-01; R405:10).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Count I. On May 21,2006, Defendant telephoned Judge Timothy Hansen four
times and, each time, left essentially the same recorded message (R. 3). Defendant
demanded that the judge pay him $750,000.00 and threatened to "execute [Judge
Hansen's] mother-f—king ass" if the judge did not comply (id.).
Count II. On May 5-7,2006, Defendant telephoned Judge Joseph Fratto, Third
District Court Judge, nine times and, each time, left essentially the same recorded
message (R. 3-2). Defendant demanded that Judge Fratto return some documents to
him and threatened to "execute [Judge Fratto's] mother-f—ing ass" if he did not
comply (R. 3-2).

9

Defendant admitted the calls seemed "bizarre," but initially alleged that they
were necessary to obtain his "fortune" and the return of his children from Lisa
Presley (R. 34-32). After he regained his competency, he admitted he was wrong to
threaten the judges (R. 403).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court may summarily reject Defendant's challenge to the trial court's
denial of his motion to withdraw because Defendant's brief wholly fails to comply
with rule 24(a) (9)'s marshaling and briefing requirements.
Defendant minimally asserts that the trial court and his plea counsel failed to
inform him of "all his constitutional rights," but does not otherwise identify the
alleged errors. Nor does he support his general allegation with developed legal
analysis and argument. Instead, he provides legal quotations and string citations,
but no application of that law to the facts of this case. He also fails to marshal the
facts that support the validity of his plea and the denial of his motion to withdraw.
Defendant's fallure to comply with rule 24 justifies summary affirmance.
Moreover, as defense counsel candidly admits, this appeal is not as much
about Defendant's plea, as about his sentence. BrAplt. at 7. He does not allege,
however, that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison or that a
prison sentence is illegal. Consequently, his complaint does not raise a legal issue.

10

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24
JUSTIFIES SUMMARY REJECTION OF HIS APPEAL AND
AFFIRMANCE OF HIS CONVICTION AND SENTENCE.
In his Summary of Argument and his argument point heading, Defendant
asserts that his guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary because the court and LDA
failed to inform him of "all of his constitutional rights/' BrAplt. at 6-7. Defendant
alleges no specifics, other than to generally claim that this violates rule 11, UTAH
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

and renders his counsel ineffective. Id. The

argument portion of his brief is entirely devoid of legal analysis, containing only
legal quotations and string citations. See BrAplt. at 7-9. He also fails to marshal the
facts that support the trial court's ruling. Because Defendant fails to comply with
the marshaling and briefing requirements of rule 24(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, this Court may summarily dismiss the appeal.
Moreover, Defendant's complaint that he is imprisoned does not raise a legal
issue. And, in any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
legally authorized punishment.
A. Defendant fails to present developed argument and reasoned
analysis.
Rule 24(a)(9) requires that Defendant provide "'a statement of the issues
presented for review' and an argument containing 'the contentions and reasons...
with respect to the issues presented... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
11

parts of the record relied on/" See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,17,611 Utah Adv. Rep.
3 (quoting the rule). Utah's appellate courts have "repeatedly noted" that a brief is
inadequate and fails to comply with the rule if "it merely contains bald citations to
authority without development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority." Id. at f 9 (internal marks and citation omitted). "An appellate court
is not a depository in which [Defendant] may dump the burden of argument and
research. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, Defendant
"must plead his claims with sufficient specificity for this [C]ourt to make a ruling on
the merits." Id. This requires Defendant to address the ruling of the trial court and
explain why that decision should be overturned. See id. at f 1 4 .
Here, the argument portion of Defendant's brief contains nothing but legal
quotations and string citations. See BrAplt. at 7-9. There is no mention of the facts,
the trial court's ruling, or alleged errors. See id. The only place where issues are
identified is in the Summary of Argument and argument point heading. But even
then, Defendant's assertions lack specificity. See id. at 6-7. Because Defendant
wholly fails to meet briefing requirements, his appeal should be summarily rejected.
See Allen, 2008 XJT 56, <f 18.

B. Defendant fails to acknowledge controlling legal standards.
In addition, though Defendant accurately cites Utah cases, he does not
acknowledge current legal standards governing the withdrawal of guilty pleas.
12

For example, Defendant suggests that a violation of rule 11 necessarily
invalidates a guilty plea. See BrAplt. at 7. That is incorrect. Rule 11(e) directs a plea
court to find that a defendant understands the constitutional rights listed in the rule
before a plea is accepted. See Add. A. The rule does not mandate, however, that the
court itself advise the defendant of those rights. It requires only that the trial court
find that the defendant has "a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of
rule 11(e)/' State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 18,114 P.3d 569. See also State v. Visser,
2000 UT 88, H 11-13, 22 P.3d 1242. But rule 11 guides only the entry of a guilty
plea. Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code governs the plea's withdrawal.
Prior to 2003, section 77-13-6 permitted a guilty plea to be withdrawn for
"good cause," which included a failure to strictly comply with rule 11 in the taking
of the plea. See State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703,704 (Utah App. 1994) (applying the
pre-2003 version of section 77-13-6 and holding that a failure to strictly comply with
rule 11 constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a plea). In 2003, the grounds for
withdrawal were narrowed. Section 77-13-6(2)(a) now permits a guilty plea to be
withdrawn only upon a "showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
See Add. A. This is a constitutional standard. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992
(Utah 1993) (recognizing that whether a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary is a
constitutional determination). This constitutional standard, unlike the former "good
cause" standard, does not require that a guilty plea strictly comply with rule 11(e).
13

See Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (holding that "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in
taking a guilty plea does not" render a plea unknowing or involuntary).
Nevertheless, when a plea is entered in compliance with rule 11(e), it is presumed to
be knowing and voluntary. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22, 26 P.3d 203.
Defendant does not acknowledge this change in the law nor explain why the trial
court erred in finding the plea knowing and voluntary.
Defendant also suggests that the plea colloquy alone determines the validity
of a guilty plea. See BrAplt. at 8. Again, this is incorrect. Rule 11 recognizes that a
trial court's finding that a plea is knowing and voluntary "may be based on
questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood,
and acknowledged the contents of the statement" UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(8)
(emphasis added). Thus, where as here, the trial court determined that Defendant
read the Statement in Support of Guilty Plea and understood and acknowledged its
contents, the Statement is properly incorporated into the record and may be relied
upon to support the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. State v. Dean, 2004
UT 63, f f 9-10,95 P.3d 276. Again, Defendant does not acknowledge this authority
nor explain why the trial court erred in incorporating and relying upon the
Statement.

14

Additionally, Defendant does not acknowledge that a plea court may rely on
other parts of the record in finding a plea knowing and voluntary. This includes,
but is not limited to, the criminal information, exhibits, the presentence report, and a
defendant's own trial experience up to the point of the plea. Visser, 2000 UT 88,f
12; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1991). Likewise, appellate review of a
trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw may consider the record as a whole,
including "the facts and circumstances in which the plea was taken." Dean, 2004 UT
63,112. Here, the validity of Defendant's plea is not solely determined by the
colloquy, but also by the written Statement, and may include the prior competency
evaluations, testimony, and findings that addressed Defendant's understanding of
the consequences of pleading guilty. See Statement of the Case & Add. B.
Defendant also suggests any ineffectiveness by LDA justifies withdrawal of
the guilty plea. Br.Aplt. at 8-9. Again, the statement does not fully reflect the legal
standard governing the withdrawal of a guilty plea. "When challenging a guilty
plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a [defendant] must
demonstrate '"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors he... would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."'" Benvenuto v. Utah, 2007
UT 53,124,165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,525 (Utah 1994)
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59 (1985)) (emphasis added). See also State v.
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61,113,167 P.3d 1046; Dean, 2004 UT 63, i 22. Defendant cites
15

similar authority, but fails to acknowledge the essential "but for" component
required to justify withdrawal of a plea. See BrAplt. at 8.
In sum, in addition to Defendant's failure to present developed argument and
reasoned analysis, his failure to acknowledge current legal standards justifies
summary rejection of his appeal. See Allen, 2008 UT 56, \ 18.
C. Defendant fails to marshal the facts supporting the trial court's
ruling.
Defendant's appeal also should be summarily rejected because he fails to meet
rule 24's marshaling requirement. Rule 24(a)(9) mandates that a "party challenging
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding." This requires Defendant to gather "every scrap of competent evidence"
supporting the trial court's findings and ruling and then establish why, despite this
supporting evidence, the trial court erred. See State v. Chavez-Expinoza, 2008 UT App
191,^1 7 & 20,186 P.3d 1023. Failure to meet the marshaling requirement permits
this Court to summarily affirm. Id.
As previously discussed, the totality of the record may be considered in
determining the validity of Defendant's plea. This includes the written Statement
and prior competency evaluations and findings. Yet, Defendant marshals none of
these facts, other than to admit that these documents exist. See BrAplt. at 2-5. This
failure alone justifies summary rejection of his appeal.

16

D. Defendant fails to challenge his sentence.
Defense counsel candidly admits in his Summary of Argument that this
appeal is not as much about his plea ("Defendant demanded counsel file an appeal
in this case"), as about his sentence ("Defendant is upset that he was sentenced to
prison rather than put on probation and into mental health court"). BrAplt. at 6 &7.
Defendant does not allege, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to prison or that a prison sentence is illegal. Consequently, his
complaint raises no legal issue.
In any case, Defendant was fully informed before he pled that a prison
sentence was possible, despite the prosecutor's recommendation for probation. See
Statement of the Case. Based on the presentence report and recommendation, the trial
court appropriately rejected the parties' recommendation and lawfully imposed a
prison sentence. And though Defendant correctly asserts that he needs mental
health treatment, Br.Aplt. at 7, incarceration does not preclude appropriate
treatment. It only ensures that, at least for now, the treatment takes places in a
secure setting.

17

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, Defendant's appeal should be summarily rejected and
his conviction and sentence affirmed.
Respectfully submitted October / / , 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

CHRISTINE R SOLUS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on October

2008, two copies of the foregoing brief were

^mailed • hand-delivered to:
Brook Sessions
Harris & Carter
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
A digital copy of the brief was also included: M^es D No

\L$nrf&3iM^

Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

§77-13-5. Withdrawal of plea
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection
(2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c 16, § 1; Laws 2003, c 290, § 1, efif. May 5,
2003; Laws 2004, c 90, § 91, eff. May 3,2004; Laws 2008, a 3, § 251, e£L Feb. 7,2008.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

RULE 2 4 . BRIEFS
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court
va;p; A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved
in the trial court
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of
this rule.
*(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
/•
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in
the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:

(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief hut not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter
service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings
of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include;
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, 'except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant - The appellee may refer to the addendum of the
appellant
» *
(c) Reply, brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of t h i s ^ u l ^ No' further
briefs may be filed except with leave of thetappellate court ; J ^
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person,' "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original recprd as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11 (f) or 11 (g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the, transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers.
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs..
.,
,?
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the*
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant unless the*
parties otherwise agree or Jthe court otherwise orders. Each party shall be

entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs
shall in combination exceed75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the
issues raised in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of
Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
| (g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant
and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and
respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant-, which
shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good
cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the
date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the
motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of
additional pages without further order of the court Whether the motion is
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the supplemental
citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response
shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998;
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1,
2006; April 1, 2008.]
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vsERNEST JOHN YOUNG,
1
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER RE:
RESTORATION OF COMPETENCY OF
DEFENDANT
Case No. 061402072
Hon. Gary D.Stott

On June 1, 2007, the Court held a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-15-6. The
defendant was personally present and represented by counsel, David Stewart. The State was
represented by B. Kent Morgan. The Court, having reviewed the letter submitted by the Richard
B. Spencer, MD, Clinical Director of the Utah State Hospital and the report of Robert F.
Sawicki, PhD, Neuropsychologist of the Utah State Hospital regarding the defendant's current
mental status and any progress made toward competency restoration, and having heard from
counsel for the defendant and for the State, now enters the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order(s) concerning the defendant's competency to stand trial:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER RE: RESTORATION
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FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Court finds that the defendant is currently suffering from a mental disorder. More
specifically, the Court is persuaded that the defendant continues to suffer from a mental illness as
set forth in Doctor Sawicki's report listing the defendant's mental illness as Schizophrenic
Spectrum Disorder, Paranoid Type.
2.

Notwithstanding the existence of a mental disorder, the Court finds that the

defendant's mental illness is being managed, and that his day to day functioning has significantly
improved. Specifically, the defendant is now able to compartmentalize his beliefs to the extent
that he is capable of rationally participating in the proceedings against him and has further
demonstrated that he has the present capacity to comprehend and appreciate the charges or
allegations against him. The defendant can state the pending charges against him, and accurately
describes the general criminal justice process he now faces including its adversarial nature and
the various roles of the parties to those court proceedings. The Court finds that the defendant is
now capable of viewing the charges against him and the procedures that might seek to hold him
accountable for those offense outside of the context of the beliefs that he previously focused on
with regard to his parentage and legal avenues available to pursue the remedies he may wish to
seek outside of the of the criminal justice process he now faces. He therefore, now has a rational
understanding of the allegations against him in the context of a real world setting.
3. As to the defendant's present capacity to disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events
and states of mind, the Court finds that the defendant can now have positive interactions with his
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attorney and can appreciate the benefits of that relationship. The defendant can accurately relate
factors that go into his criminal case, mitigating circumstances and possible defenses and can
make reasoned choices in accordance with facts he may wish to discuss with his counsel and stay
on track with pertinent issues.
4. The Court finds that the defendant is able to differentiate potential penalties carried by
either a felony or misdemeanor conviction that could result in this case and therefore has the
present capacity to comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties that
may be imposed in the proceedings against him. The Court finds that the defendant understands
the penalties that may be imposed in the event he were convicted of the offenses charged against
him.

I
5. The Court finds that his improved abilities to stay focused on the pertinent issues of

the case provide a basis for finding that the defendant has the present capacity to engage in
reasoned choice of legal strategies and options and to appreciate the consequences of choosing to
represent himself or taking the advice of counsel.
6. The Court finds that the defendant has the capacity to, and in fact understands the
adversary nature of the proceedings against him and the roles of the attorneys, the judge and the
jury applicable to his case without impediment of his strongly held beliefs about matters that are
not pertinent to the criminal allegations lodged against him.
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7. The Court finds based upon the report referenced above, and the observations of the
defendant by the Court, the defendant has the present capacity to manifest appropriate courtroom
behavior for sustained periods of time that would be necessary in a trial.
8,

The Court finds that as a result of the defendant's demonstrated ability to

compartmentalize his strongly held beliefs, he presently has the capacity to testify relevantly.
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9. The Court finds that in spite of suffering from a mental disorder, the present efforts
demonstrated by the defendant towards his attorney in the proceedings against him establish that
the defendant can have a quality relationship with his counsel and the defendant can discuss
relevant matters with his attorney and consider and choose to accept sound advice provided to
him by his counsel.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes by a preponderance of
evidence that the defendant is currently competent to stand trial in that, while he is currently
suffering from a mental disorder, notwithstanding that disorder
1. He does have a factual understanding of the proceedings against him;
2. He does have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him;
3. He does have a factual and rational understanding of the punishment specified for the
offenses charged; and
4. He has the ability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings
against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
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ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stay of the criminal proceedings in
this matter is hereby lifted, and the defendant is to be returned to the Utah County Jail with bail
as originally set in the in the amount of $10,000 is to remain;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pleading styled as a Notice to Submit for a
Decision referencing a "writ of habeas corpus" among other matters apparently seeking release
from the Utah State Hospital is now moot, and upon that basis is hereby dismissed.
A preliminary hearing is presently scheduled for June 14,2007 at 1:30 p.m.

DATED this / j

day of June, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

David Stewart

/

~^)kcM—
jfpzr
GARYD. ST07T, Di^tncf Judge
:
- J
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m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN
SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND
CERTD7ICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 061402072

ERNEST JOHN YOUNG,
aka: Jason Presley
Defendant.

Judge Gary D. Stott

I, ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
and that I understand the following facts and rights:
I

NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Influencing, Impeding, or Retaliating
Against a Judge UCA §76-8-316

F3

1

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
0-5 years in prison $5000 fine
plus 85% surcharge $25 security
fee

• Enhanceable Second Offense. (Only if checked.)
I know and understand that if I am convicted in the future of this same crime, the second
<conviction will be a [Class
Misdemeanor/
Degree Felony]. The maximum penalty for
that crime is

.

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading
.guilty (or no contest).

A.

The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, on or about May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, did
threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge with the intent to impede, intimidate, or
interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of the judge's official duties or
with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the performance of those
official duties.
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed

above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and
prove the elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):
On May 5, 2006, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Ernest John Young made several phone calls to
Judge Hansen of the Third District Court, and threatened to execute him if he did not accept Mr.
Young's Petition to Seek the Death Penalty and Law Suit.

2

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no
contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel. I know that I have therightto be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
service to me. I have not waived myrightto counsel. My attorney is David A. Stewart. My
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, myrights,and the consequences of my guilty
(no contest) plea.
Jury Trial. I know that I have arightto a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up thatrightby pleading guilty (no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, a) I would have therightto see and observe the witnesses who testify against me and b) my
attorney would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against
me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State

3

would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a
juiy trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify
against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime.
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set
for trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
.and will be admitting that I committed the crime stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the cost of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the

4

statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.

|

I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
I
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or
no contest) plea now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to
which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record
that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.

5

Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea is the result of a plea bargain between
myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain,
if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
I will plead to Count 1 as charged. The State will dismiss Count 2. The State is not
opposed to a 402 reduction of Count 1 to a Class A misdemeanor so long as I successfully
complete probation. **\l*-** S^fcu^c <-*JUI rcoo **\ Y*I*JL - j * * - ^ *vuj
se^-te^te^/K
t o e &e^^L * f 4 ^ **€****( h ^ t - f ^ Co^r^
Cjf$
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentence concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge
may do are not binding on the judge.
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

6

I am ^O years of age. I have attended school through

^

jgm&e. I can read and

understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which would impair
my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug,
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file
a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that
for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea
if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge
to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this J H ^ d a y of

d*s^

, 2007

ERNEST JOHN Yj
DEFENDANT

7

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for ERNEST JOHN YOUNG, the defendant above, and
that I know he has read the statement or that I have read it to him; I have discussed it with him
and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime and factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No.
/aoSl^>

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against ERNEST JOHN
YOUNG, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct. No
improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered
and that the acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest

8

/

ORDER
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the
signatures andfindsthat defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea isfreely,knowingly, and
voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea to the crime
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this

cf

day of

, 2007.

-*^'.?h
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2 I

(Electronically recorded on June 14, 2007)

3

MR. STEWART: It's Mr. Young's intent to waive his

4 J preliminary hearing today, and then we've reached a resolution
5 J in this matter.

Being a Salt Lake County case, we're going

6

to request that he be transported up to the Salt Lake County

7

Jail for process of —

8

defense side —

9

Jail pending sentencing also for screening for mental health

10

well, when I say "we," I mean the

be transported up to the Salt Lake County

Court, participation up there.

11

That doesn't have to happen right away.

That could

12

happen after sentencing, as well.

I just want to let the Court

13

know that screening can take place after sentencing, but —

14

THE COURT: Okay, what's the resolution?

15

MR. STEWART: He's going to be pleading to Count I, as

16

charged.

The State will move to dismiss Count II.

17

MR. MORGAN: That's correct, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Hold on a minute, (inaudible).

Count I is

19

the third-degree on influencing, pending, and retaliating; is

20

that right?

21

MR. STEWART: Yes.

22

MR. MORGAN: Yes.

23

THE COURT: Count II is to be dismissed?

24

MR. MORGAN: Yes, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: Mr. Stewart, have you had an opportunity to

-3go through the statements (inaudible) with him?
MR. STEWART: I have, your Honor, and he's read through
it.
THE COURT: Do you think he understands the information
in that as to his Constitutional Rights that he's giving up,

1
and as to the potential sentences involved in this case?
MR. STEWART: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Mr. Young

«

MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: —
me.

you've heard your lawyer's statements to

Do you agree with what he's just told me?
MR. YOUNG: That's correct.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you give up the

Constitutional Rights that are set forth in that document that
you've talked with your lawyer about, you do not have any
further opportunity to contest the charges against you?
MR. YOUNG: That's correct.

The file's not going to

get any bigger, your Honor.

|

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter how big it is. The
ultimate question is when does it get settled.
MR. YOUNG: Yeah.
THE COURT: Do you now have any questions or concerns
that you feel you need to talk with Mr. Stewart about before I
ask you for your plea to this charge?
MR. YOUNG: Only —

you did say transfer to mental

-4health Court correct?
MR. STEWART: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Correct.
MR. YOUNG: I understand.
THE COURT: Do you also understand that this is —

the

charge is a third-degree felony —
MR. YOUNG: Yes.
THE COURT: —
sentence —

which carries with it a possible

a maximum sentence of zero to five years in the

Utah State Prison?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that as to the sentence
in this case, there are no guarantees of what the sentence
might be, except that the maximum sentence can be imposed?

Do

you understand that?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir.

I do.

THE COURT: Is there a contemplation by Counsel that
this case be referred to Adult Probation for a pre-sentence
report?
MR. MORGAN: I think that would be appropriate.

In

the interim, I'm going to use my offices in the Third District
Court to see how mental health Court sentencing will best fit
with this case; and I'm going to strongly recommend that as
part of sentencing.
THE COURT: Okay, see what —

we'll see what all the

!

1

-5~

Courts do for us. Has he signed the statement, Mr. Stewart?

2

MR. STEWART: He has not yet.

,

3

THE COURT: Why don't you have him sign it.

I find

4

that Mr. Young knows and understands the Constitutional Rights

5

that are set forth in the document.

6

document with his attorney.

7

questions and concerns.

8

needs to talk with his lawyer about concerning the information

9

in that statement.

He's gone over that

He's had an opportunity to ask

He now has nothing additional that he

10

MR. YOUNG: Uh-huh.

11

THE COURT: He understands —

Mr. Young understands

12

that there are no guarantees of what the sentence might be,

13

except that the Court may impose the maximum sentence in this

14

case, which is zero to five years in the Utah State Prison.

15

It's the intention of Mr. Young to enter a plea of

16

guilty of charge in Count I, because he's in fact guilty of

17

that offense.

18

waiver as freely, voluntarily and knowingly given.

He's signed the statement, and I accept his
I'll sign

19 I off on it now. Accept it.
20

Okay, Mr. Young, to the charge of the third-degree

21

felony, influencing, pending, or retaliating against a Judge or

22

a member of the Board of Pardons, a third-degree felony, what's

23

you plea to that charge?

24

MR. YOUNG: Guilty.

25

THE COURT: A guilty plea is entered.

The second count

-61

is dismissed.

I'll refer it to the Adult Probation and Parole

2

for a pre-sentence Court. Any information that Counsel desires

3

me to consider at the time of sentencing, which will be on

4

July the 26th at 10 a.m., should be submitted either before,

5

so he can consider it; or we'll be resuming at the time of

6

—

7

anything you have.

or sentenced 7/26, exchange it before, and I'll look at

8

MR. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor.

9

MR. STEWART: Your Honor, is he to remain at the Utah

10

County Jail, then?

11

THE COURT: Yes, sir. Okay.

12

MR. MORGAN: With leave to change that, if that should

13
14
15

become necessary before sentencing?
THE COURT: You may.

I guess there's an agreement to

do that, if necessary, right?

16

MR. STEWART: Right.

17

THE COURT: That's agreeable.

If there is a need to

18

change his current status from the Utah County Jail to Salt

19

Lake County Jail, that may be done.

20

MR. MORGAN: Thank you, your Honor.

21

MR. STEWART: Thank you.

22

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

23

(Hearing concluded)

